If there has been one development that defined the long 19th century, it has been the emergence and prominence of the nation-state as a form of government and a mechanism for control. Whereas prior formulations of the state took the guise of vast empires, autonomous city-states, and small principalities, the era following the political revolutions of France and the United States saw the conceptual creation of nations as internally cohesive, formally defined units, ideal building blocks on which to ground and legitimize state institutions. This reconfiguration of the social and political landscape did not, however, come into being autonomously, nor were the newfound nationalities of the 1800’s historical entities which simply needed to be rediscovered by observant philosophers, economists, and statesmen. On the contrary, the fundamental definitions and conceptions of both nation and state became a battleground of competing and often highly conflictual theories, whose adherents removed the debate from manifestos and lecture halls to the boulevards and barricades; schools of thought which dominated the debate came from both Marxist and anti-Marxist perspectives, centering on fundamental questions emphasizing the primacy of class, race, ethnicity, and development in formulating who constituted a nation, what comprised the state, and how the two became intertwined within a historical context. Divergent beliefs manifested themselves in actual government policies, took root in national and social consciousness, and delineated the forms and functions of both; foundational theories of the nation largely agree on it’s constructed, artificial, and amorphous character, yet continually and violently clash on the question of the state in its abstraction.
Michel Foucault’s central contribution to this discourse has been through the concept of governmentality and its relation to the rise of the modern state form, which he expounds upon in a series of lectures delivered at the Collège de France from 1977-78 titled Security, Territory, Population. This new notion of governmentality was both a description of the ensemble of institutions, methods, mechanisms and analyses through which power is projected upon a subject population and, simultaneously, a lens through which one can trace the historical development of “a series of specific governmental apparatuses.” Within this theoretical framework, the emergence of the state as a form of governmental authority directly corresponds to the recognition of the population as subject-body to be regulated at the macro level, in which the totality of institutions, systems of knowledge, and security apparatuses are employed by the state in the furtherance of Foucault’s secondary concept, raison d’État. By tracing the genesis of the modern state through the prism of governmentality, Foucault is able to discuss its emergence not with appeal to ideology but through the study of power projection and consolidation; the notion of raison d’État fits squarely within this intellectual structure, existing as principle guiding the formation and subsequent actions of the state system. Indeed, raison d’État posits the state as simply a functionary of governmental rationality, as “a principle of intelligibility and strategic schema” which develops along a historical genealogy of governmentality and which holds the state as a highly developed apparatus of governmental reason.
In this way, Foucault’s theory allows for an understanding of the state that frees it from context dependent definitions or justifications, elevating the creation of the state to an abstraction that owes its emergence to a “composition of effects” delineated via governmentality, which serves as a device for historical analysis. As such, competing definitions and interpretations of the state and the nation, ideologically motivated or otherwise, can be subsumed into Foucault’s general theory, eschewing as it does an animating dogma or program beyond that of power consolidation and reformulation; both Marxist and anti-Marxist arguments can be situated within a Foucauldian framework, and often find their arguments buttressed by his conclusions. Theories that focus on the various exercises of authority and control by state systems, such as Louis Althusser’s Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses from Essays on Ideology, are coterminous with Foucault’s understanding of the function of raison d’État, which must act on the consciousness of people “in such a way that their opinion is modified…and along with their opinion their way of doing things, their way of acting, their behavior as economic subjects and political subjects.” As an introductory theory of the state, Foucault’s influence and import cannot be ignored, and it serves as an excellent foundation from which to view alternate and competing arguments about Nietzsche’s coldest monster.
Similar to Foucault’s theory on governmentality, Otto Bauer approaches the nation by describing it as a composition of effects in his essay “The Nation.” There exists a national character amongst a group of people that describes their unique physical and mental characteristics, and is shaped by their existential struggles, social compositions, and cultural traditions. National character naturally comes about and changes throughout the course of history, like Foucault’s “episode of governmentality” view on states. While national character could be interpreted as a trans-historical entity, the very thing Foucault sought to disprove in his theories, Bauer claims otherwise, specifically stating, “[n]ational character is not an explanation, it is something to be explained.” Alongside national character is national spirit. Bauer is quick to distance himself from any sort of Hegelian Spirit; while this national spirit is the spirit of the people that persists through all changes a nation goes through, it explains nothing. National spirit, like character, needs an explanation. Bauer’s explanations lies in what he calls “national communities”; the nation is a community of culture because of the shared traditions among the people, the nation is a community of destiny because it holds a common history for the people, and the nation is a community of character because of the various social class it contains. While these communities help compose the national character and spirit, capitalism makes it uniform. Capitalism uprooted families from their homes and brought them into cities where through labor, popular education, universal military service, and equal suffrage, a uniform language and culture was created. Since capitalism Bauer maintains a Foucauldian perspective on the nation, merely only describing what has happened and why; he never unveils a trans-historical, all-explaining device that shows how the nation was always what it was meant to be and was simply waiting to find itself.
Bauer begins to differ from Foucault when he introduces Karl Marx’s historical method to “solve” the question of the nation, ultimately classifying it as a historical entity. Through national materialism, the nation produces itself out of the community of its national character, national spirit provides the history of the nation via the shared history of its people, and a Darwinistic view allows the nation to be viewed as a “never completed product” of a perpetual process which is fueled by “human struggle with nature.” Here is where Bauer assigns the nation a concrete manifestation and historical purpose; the nation is no longer an episode of governmentality.
Elman Service offers a departure from Marx’s historical notion of the class-conflict driven origin of the state in his anthropological approach. Like Marx, Service surveys human history and uses those results as justification for his theory. However, Service’s findings “do not support the [Marxist] economic-class element of the state [which is] based on repressive physical force” in order to protect the propertied class in power. According to Service’s researches on archaic society, the origin of the “state” is that of centralized leadership; “chiefdoms” being the way Service describes it. The “state” begins as personal power, that of an affluent chief or leader, which then becomes institutionalized by society. Next, subsidiary positions appear, creating a hierarchy. The succession of this hierarchy was hereditary in most archaic civilizations which insured the continuity of the positions of the centralized leadership, therefore allowing the hierarchy to continue “beyond the period of the competencies of the individual incumbents.” This forms the skeleton of Service’s “state” to which he adds a legal apparatus and mechanisms for redistribution of power in subsequent chapters. Though this theory of the state is born from the study of archaic societies, Service argues that modern states exhibit similar tendencies of his theorized “chiefdom”.
The centering of state authority around individuals in a manner reminiscent of a chiefdom was exploded, however, in the late 18th century with the rise of political and social liberalism, spurred on by such writers as Locke, Montesquieu, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau contends, in his essay On Social Contract, that the state is a development based upon the necessity of man to foster a sense of self-preservation. He begins by asserting that the state form inherently controls the liberty of those who reside within it, as he states in his opening line: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” Rousseau, however, investigates these restrictions enforced by the state and posits that it ensures the liberty of those who reside within the state. This seeming paradox is a function of the titular social contract, the necessary output of people having to work together to overcome obstacles which they could not overcome of their own volition. Consequently, by having a community of people give their full will into a singular cause, the state form arises as the conglomeration of a multitude of voices functioning for a common desire of self-preservation. As the state is a function of the social contract cited by Rousseau, he outlines it as being created by each person “giving himself entirely” thus ensuring that no one is creating unnecessary burdens for the other, not possessing any rights in opposition to the goals of this new collective as it undermines the very basis of the collective, and thus not allowing for the appearance of a dominant singular person or force within the system since they all must work in harmony, thus ensuring all keep their natural freedom within the pact. The state, as a consequence, must function within the bounds of the established contract for its founding. Much like a father looking over his child, the state functions at a primary level for protection and growth, which in turn requires restrictions in order to ensure that no self-harm falls upon the subject, yet equally mandates no unnecessary or overbearing restraints be laid upon the subjects to prevent the retardation of growth of those functioning within the state. Per Rousseau, the state form ultimately ensures a better situation than what is created in the natural state of being in that by dedicating their lives
to the state, they are, in return, protected by it, and the risking of one’s life in defense of one’s state is a simple equitable exchange for the protection afforded to the person thanks to the state.
Foucault’s concept of governmentality echoes many of the points which Rousseau lays out himself. The former’s concept of a “composition of effects” seems to be slightly related to Rousseau’s idea that the state arises through a collaboration of individuals pooling their efforts for the greater good over a period of time due to their inability to combat threats on a singular basis. Foucault’s calling of the state a device of projecting power in the most rational and effective way possible echoes Rousseau’s thoughts as Rousseau postulated that the state naturally arose through the collaboration of people and their inherent willingness to give their all for a common cause. The critical divergence is embedded in that Rousseau believes that the organization of power – that of collaboration – is the most ideal of circumstances whereas Foucault is of the belief that the state is just another method of organizing power. Whereas the state arose through careful self-introspection in Foucault’s eyes in conjunction through the pooling of events leading up to that particular moment which gave birth to the state, Rousseau argues that the state is a phenomenon bound to spring forth should a community gather and collectively formulate a social contract mandating each person fully commit themselves to the betterment of the overall state.
Academic theories of both nation and state had concrete implications for Meiji Japan. The centrality of apparatuses of security and governmentality within Foucault’s work is highly applicable to the early Japanese state, which was characterized by a well-developed internal police system and a governmental apparatus that deployed a variety of ideological and social mechanisms in the pursuit of crafting the very Japanese nation-state it claimed to rule. Institutions and traditions were either created wholesale or roughly anchored in the past, all in an effort to solidify the newly established principle of Imperial rule. Additionally, the concept of raison d’Etat explains the frenetic pursuit for recognition by the dominant world powers of nation-state status, an attempt to guarantee survival in an imperialist world order. Bauer’s views on the nation can also be seen within Japan during the Meiji Era. There is a national character with a shared culture, history, and language, which the government conceived of to serve the purpose of the nation-state; strikingly, this ties into Service’s views on chiefdom and leadership, with the subjects of the old Tokugawa shogunate were slowly led to believe they had always been subjects of the Emperor. Furthermore, as the nation-state’s roots began to grow in Japan, Rousseau’s ideas gained relevance as well, especially in the years from 1870-1880 in which a sentiment of optimism and possibility, specifically in the context of democratic, republican government, took hold. Regardless of the degree to which it naturally occurred or which it was explicitly created, multiple theorists would agree that Meiji Japan is an example of the ways in which both nation and state emerge.
 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, ed. François Ewald et al., trans. Graham Burchell, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 108.
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 286.
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 238.
 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 275.
 Otto Bauer, “The Nation,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 40.
 Bauer, “The Nation,” 41.
 Bauer, “The Nation,” 46.
 Bauer, “The Nation,” 57.
 Service, Elman. Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1975. 8
 Elman, Origins of the State and Civilization, 8
 Elman, Origins of the State and Civilization, 72
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “On Social Contract,” in Rousseau’s Political Writings, ed. Alan Ritter (New York City: WW Norton & Company, 1988), 85.
 Rousseau, “On Social Contract,” 92-93.
 Rousseau, “On Social Contract,” 86.
 Rousseau, “On Social Contract,” 103.
Service, Elman. Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc, 1975.
Service writes his Origins of the State and Civilization as an anthropologist interested in the similarities in the development of archaic civilizations. He argues that most archaic civilizations do not fit the typical definition of the state as posited by thinkers such as Marx and Lenin; a repressive force which coincides with the rise of civilization used to control the masses. He then considers several modern primitive states as case studies : Zulu State, Ankole State in Uganda, Cherokee Indians, Polynesia, Mesoamerica, Peru, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus River Valley, and China, in order to highlight the lack of historical basis for a class-conflict theory of origin of state or civilization. Service posits that the state is born from centralized leadership; chiefdom being the term he uses. For Service, the essential ingredients to “stateness” are the power of force and the power of authority, whether it is legitimized by custom, hierarchy, or law. Through his research of the primitive state he shows that they worked to protect not another class, but the state itself. Service also extends this to the economy as he argues that the primitive systems were redistributive rather than acquisitive. Unlike in Marxist ideology, personal wealth is not a requirement for political power. His approach is helpful in its use of concrete historical examples in distinguishing his definition of the state.
Tagore, Rabindranath. “Nationalism in the West.” Nationalism. New York City: MacMillian Company, 1917. 13-61. Print.
Rabindranath Tagore argues – through a collection of lectures he delivered in the United States as compiled in the book Nationalism – that the nation is a machination designed to propagate its own power and legitimize human greed through artificial competition. Thus, he asserts that the nation is distinctly unnatural creation which subverts the natural, therefore hurting humanity as a whole. Tagore formulates his argument through first defining man’s natural state, that of adapting to the difficulties he faces while still recognizing his status as a human being, thus pushing him to do what is necessary for long-term successes, even if it creates issues for him in the short-term. Man, therefore, must overcome the physical obstacles he faces by organizing power – in essence, power must be consolidated for the goal of defense to facilitate self-growth of the people in that society. Coalescing power in such a manner inherently calls for restrictions, as Tagore describes through his example of a man walking on a gravel road. In this description, Tagore posits that a person walking barefooted on gravel will experience pain but eventually adjust to the situation at hand; walking in shoes, however, prevents the adaptation while providing comfort. The key issue with the latter situation is that the appearance of even a little gravel in the shoe creates great discomfort, and the person is inhospitable to such an intrusion. The nation, in Tagore’s eyes, are these shoes, yet they are extremely tight and prevent no room for the feet to adopt should any gravel manage to enter the shoe – thus systematically destroying human tolerance. The nation is created as a machine for success – it is, as he states, “the object and justification of a machine, while goodness only is the end and purpose of man” – and to do so, it organizes the populace on a mass scale into individual parts of a machine, destroying whatever humanity is present in the system. To Tagore, the nation, in its desire for success, purposefully seeks conflict and conquest, and when it does achieve the latter goal, it subjugates the people it has conquered under a mechanical hand in slowing the growth of the colonized while exploiting it for their own. While possessing a few benefits drawn from its organization, Tagore ultimately paints the nation as a near-evil phase in human history drawn to create a mechanized, inhuman, form of success.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. “On Social Contract.” Rousseau’s Political Writings. Ed. and trans. Alan Ritter and Julia Conway Bondanella. New York City: W. W. Norton & Comopany, 1988. 84-173.Print.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau opens his essay, On Social Contract, with the famed line, “Man was born free, and he is everywhere in chains.” This statement asserts that man is inherently bound by the restrictions placed upon him by the bounds of the state that he resides within. Critically, the essay does not merely state that man is lacking liberty under the rule of the state, but it also dissects the reason to why the state form developed in the manner that it did. Rousseau first establishes that man’s fundamental aim is his own preservation and so he develops relationships with other people with that goal in mind. This, to him, is the basis of the most fundamental of societies: the family, which is predicated upon the agreement of father protecting child. The state form, thus is an elaboration of that particular relationship on a much larger scale. Over time, it people could not simply deal with obstacles with just their own strength; indeed, to achieve their goal of self-preservation, they needed to work together. To unite their powers, the partaking members inherently create Rousseau’s titular social contract, in which each individual fully surrenders themselves for the good of the community as a whole. According to Rousseau, since each person gives themselves fully to the community, there is no self-interest in creating an unnecessary burden for others as it will negatively impact themselves. Furthermore, since each person has to give themselves fully to this society in order for it to succeed, they are incapable of having any rights which stand in opposition to the goals of the larger collective as it will undermine the basis of having a multitude of people working together in complete harmony. Since all are equally giving themselves for the benefits of the society, no one stands above others, ensuring all keep their natural freedom in entering the pact. The state, in Rousseau’s interpretation, is the conglomeration of individuals agreeing to give themselves fully in the service of each other in order to achieve their own ultimate goal of self-preservation. The state acts towards the individual much as a father acts towards their child: it provides the protection necessary for survival and in return the individual or child returns with a willing acceptance to fully provide their abilities for the benefit of the larger collective. As such, the legitimized power gives the individual a range of behaviors in which they have their liberty as it will then not undermine the self-protection goal of the state. As the state is a reflection of the general will it is not infallible – it can towards unideal outcomes – but it will ultimately correct itself into what is necessary for the sake of the citizens’ goal of self-protection, and later, the general good of the populace. The liberty of those in the state are ensured by the state being a product of the originally-agreed social contract; an overreach by the state in the restrictions they impose upon its citizens will undermine that contract and consequently undermine the validity of that state’s existence.
Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology. London: Verso, 1984.
Louis Althusser, in his brief collection of essays, attempts to formulate a more complete and exhaustive theory regarding the ways in which the State, and necessarily the conditions of class conflict and repression, are continuously reproduced and reified. Writing firmly within Marxist political theory, Althusser recognizes the fundamental accuracy in the description of the State as a superstructure determined and built upon the infrastructure of production; however, he finds Marx’s 19th century evaluation to be relatively descriptive in nature, without accounting for or explaining the ways and means in which the State, as a “function of State power” dominated by a given ruling class, is able to reproduce the conditions necessary for its continuous supremacy. Indeed, in Althusser’s attempt to go beyond Marx’s description of the superstructure and its relation to the mode of production he argues that the State can only be understood through the fundamental mechanism of ideological reproduction. He delineates two forms in which the State, and therefore the dominant class, is able to secure for itself both its survival and expansion: the Repressive State Apparatus, which encompasses the systems of direct control and coercion, and the Ideological State Apparatuses, which, while less viscerally coercive, are nevertheless the preeminent method for reproducing the social structure allowing the dominant class to maintain its authority. The basic differentiation between the two relies on the devices used in projecting power: while the former relies on violence at its most fundamental level, the Ideological State Apparatuses deploy a plurality of means which function by fashioning and inculcating the ideological prescriptions of the given regime. Notably, in contrast to State power, which is the focal point upon which all political conflict revolves around, State apparatuses continue to exist regardless of a change in the political order; they are the indoctrinating forces that allow for the continual reproduction of the social topography of a given superstructure, regardless of the form of government specified. The concept of Ideological State Apparatuses and the centrality of system reproduction in Althusser’s work serves as a prism through which to view and understand the practices and mechanisms deployed by the Meiji state in the early years of its existence; from the education system to the media, cultural practices to spiritual exercises, the government sought to perpetuate itself through ideological indoctrination and revitalization.
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
In E. J. Hobsbawm’s exploration into the nature and history of nations and national sentiment, he underscores the constant ambiguity and opaqueness surrounding both their definition and constitution. Nations, Hobsbawm argues, are both a novel historical phenomenon and the product of conscious construction by certain individuals and groups; however, the very concept of the nation needed to be determined before this development could occur. Historically, Hobsbawm writes, the philology of the nation was explicit in its connection with one’s local province or region, without any of the contemporary definitions that hold it synonymous with the population of a given state. The slow construction of whom or what constituted a nation, then, was fraught with political conflict in a manner unique to the social-Darwinism of 19th century Europe; as nations slowly became the building blocks necessary for a community’s survival in the international arena, the definition and granting of nationhood status became ever more an exercise in power-politics. Hobsbawm argues that, despite intellectual debates concerning the characteristics necessary for a people to be classified as a nation, in reality only three factors were determinate: a historic association with an already existing state, or one with a substantial history; the existence of an established cultural elite possessing a written literary and administrative vernacular; and, in keeping with realpolitik of the era, the proven capacity for conquest. He maintains that social Darwinist thinking shaped 19th century liberalism’s political theories and placed the newfangled concept of “nation” within that intellectual arena, attaching to the nation not just a valuation as a political entity or instrument, but as the manifestation of social evolution; those peoples who failed to attain nation status were considered developmentally stagnant, and were almost invariably subsumed and assimilated into newly dominant nation-states. As a historical argument, the emphasis Hobsbawm places on 19th century liberalism’s adoption of social Darwinism as the dominant evolutionary theory for explaining the rise of nation-states allows for a more nuanced appreciation of the Meiji government’s frenetic fixation on having Japan recognized as such; it was a strategy for survival in a newly formulated and established world order.
Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population. Edited by François Ewald and Alessandro Fontana; translated by Graham Burchell. New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Michel Foucault’s 1977-78 lectures at the Collège de France revolve around the question and subject of governmentality. Governmentality, Foucault argues, is a historically specific phenomenon that arose concurrently with the recognition that the population as a mass, as a cohesive entity, was a subject to be acted upon by the state; whereas former conceptions of state power focused on the regulation of individual conduct, governmentality delineates the complex systems of knowledge and apparatuses of security which the state utilizes when managing the population as a unit. However the state, Foucault claims, is also itself an episode of governmentality, existing as a device for projecting power in the most rational and effective way possible, and this rationality cuts to the core of what Foucault believes to be the genesis of the historically modern state structure; much as the population needed to first be recognized as a locus of observation and a body to be operated upon, the state necessarily had to undergo its own process of self-reflection, of becoming an object of knowledge and analysis. This, Foucault maintains, is the process behind the rise of raison d’État, which fused the need for self-awareness by the state qua state with its existence as an apparatus of knowledge concerning the population. The discovery of the need for raison d’État in the mid-17th century is, Foucault contends, one of the motivating factors for the creation of the state as a mode of governmentality, with the state serving as both a schema of intelligibility for reality and the objective of governmental reason; it is at once both the subject and the object of raison d’État. Within the context of Meiji Japan, it’s Foucault’s conception of governmentality provides a framework in which to view the active state building of the nascent Meiji government, and the ways and means in which it deployed apparatuses of security to protect and perpetuate itself.
Bauer, Otto. “The Nation.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, 39-77. London: Verso, 1996.
In his essay, “The Nation,” Otto Bauer ultimately defines the relationship between the nation and the state, but does so by first constructing what composes the nation. Bauer lays out several key characteristics of the nation that he later elaborates on: national character, national communities, capitalism, socialism, and language. Bauer defines national character as the physical and mental differences between one nation and another and is the product of a nation’s history. National character serves as the umbrella term for the various “communities” that Bauer brings into play. Nations are cultural communities because of the culture and tradition they preserve. Nations are communities of destiny as they bind people together who share a common struggle. Nations are communities of character that house various social classes. The nation is a composition of all these various communities that is then established by capitalism, socialism, and language. With capitalism came industry, and industry pulled families off their farms and into cities for work. Within cities, through labor and education, a uniform culture and language is created amongst the people of a nation. That uniform language is then a permanent bond between the people. Bauer is clear to state that language on its own does not make a nation, but when working in tandem with the other elements he describes, solidifies national character. Since the forces of capitalism go unnoticed by the people, Bauer claims, socialism is required for the nation to become autonomous. Capitalism drives the nation of the level of the individual, whereas socialism brings individuals together to drive the nation as a whole. Bauer then explains how the nation-state model was sought to prevent foreign rule, as one could be governed by an alien state but not an alien nation. The ever-growing nature of capitalism also called for a large state to provide for it, so European nations quickly embraced the state. Bauer calls the state an artificial product and the nation a natural model that lives inside one, and claims that it is the state’s role to bind the nation politically.
Habermas, Jürgen. “The European Nation-state–Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan, 281-294. London: Verso, 1996.
“The European Nation-state–Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” is ultimately Habermas’ beliefs on the place of nation-states and national citizenship in the era of globalization. But to reach the conclusions he makes, Habermas lays out what he believes to compose the nation, state, and nation-state. Like other theorists, Habermas describes the nation to be what is created or imagined by the likes of historians and writers, pulled from a shared history and culture of a certain people, and the state to be the political construct created by lawyers and diplomats. The nation can be traced back to feudal Europe, where a common people were bound by common language and history under the ruling class, known as the Adelsnation (nation of nobility). This eventually transformed into the Volksnation (nation of the people) with movements fueled by the educated urban middle-class to bring more power to the people. The state came into play as a way of secularizing the nation given the issues that religion and divine legitimation were beginning to present. The nation-state came about from the combination of the modern nation and modern state Habermas presents. The nation-state works because the nation and state rely on each other; state administrations require taxes, but markets require laws and regulations. The nation provides the spirit of unity and citizenship, while the state makes it legal. The state provides the structure and the nation provides the substance.